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CASE NOTES
JURY SERVICE-AUTOMATIC EXEMPTIONS FROM
JURY SERVICE FOR WOMEN VIOLATE THE FAIR-
CROSS-SECTION REQUIREMENT OF THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT-Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
Billy Duren fatally shot one person and wounded another
during an attempted robbery at a United States Post Office in
Jackson County, Missouri.' He was convicted of first degree
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.' In a pretrial mo-
tion to quash the petit jury panel and in a postconviction mo-
tion for a new trial, the defendant claimed that the fair-cross-
section' requirement of the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution was violated by a jury selection process
that excluded women.' The trial court denied both motions,
and defendant appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court. The
state supreme court affirmed the denial of both motions.
Missouri law provided automatic exemptions from jury
duty for any woman who did not wish to serve.' Women could
opt out of jury duty at three stages.' First, questionnaires list-
ing disqualifications or exemptions were sent to prospective
jurors. An exemption could be claimed by returning the ques-
tionnaire or by returning a summons subsequently received. In
addition, women who did not wish to serve could merely fail
© 1979 by Evet Abt.
1. State v. Duren, 556 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Mo. 1977). The defendant killed Carol
Riley who attempted to thwart the crime, then turned and wounded Lee Kinnison, a
bystander. Sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict was not challenged. Id.
2. Id. The defendant had previously been charged with "capital" murder, and
successfully challenged the statutes requiring that persons convicted of first degree
murder be put to death. State v. Duren, 547 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Mo. 1977). He lost his
effort to have the indictment reversed, however. Id. Subsequently, Duren challenged
the composition of the jury.
3. The requirement that a jury be drawn from a fair cross-section of the com-
munity arose in Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940), where a jury selection process
that systematically excluded blacks was held to violate the sixth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968), made the federal standards applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.
4. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 360 (1979).
5. Mo. REV. STAT. § 494.031(2) (Supp. 1978), provided in pertinent part: "The
following persons shall, upon their timely application to the court, be excused from
service as a juror, either grand or petit: . . . (2) Any woman who requests exemption
before being sworn as a juror."
6. 439 U.S. at 361.
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to appear for jury duty, and were customarily excused. Other
individuals seeking exemptions at this stage had to apply to the
court.'
In ruling against the defendant, the state supreme court
distinguished the Missouri selection process from the system
deemed unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court
in Taylor v. Louisiana.' In Taylor, the Supreme Court struck
down a provision of the Louisiana state code of criminal proce-
dure requiring that a "woman should not be selected for jury
service unless she had previously filed a written declaration of
her desire to be subject to jury service." 9 The Supreme Court
found that the provision systematically excluded women, ' thus
contravening the fair-cross-section requirement of the sixth
amendment."
The Missouri high court reasoned that the state selection
process did not systematically exclude women." Instead, the
Missouri procedure provided that state courts could grant an
exemption from jury service to any woman who requested one. "
The court reasoned that since the Missouri selection procedure
did not require that women affirmatively indicate their availa-
bility for jury duty as did the unconstitutional procedure in
Taylor, and since the Taylor decision permitted reasonable
exemptions from jury service, Missouri's automatic exemption
procedure was constitutional.'4
Finally, the Missouri court disapproved the defendant's
use of statistics in challenging the jury selection process. The
defendant had argued that based on the 1970 census, 54 per-
cent of the Jackson County residents were women, while only
29.5 percent of all venires summoned and 15.5 percent of those
appearing were women during the month of defendant's trial.
The state supreme court felt that the census figures were dated
and did not reflect the relevant pool of women eligible to serve
on juries, since juries were drawn from voter registration lists.
The court emphasized that in Taylor, only 10 percent of the
7. Id. at 362.
8. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
9. Id.
10. The prosecution had stipulated that approximately 53 percent of the popula-
tion in the district where defendant Taylor was tried were women; but women com-
prised only 10 percent of the jury wheel. Id. at 524.
11. Id. at 531.
12. 556 S.W.2d at 15.
13. Id. at 13 n.1.
14. Id. at 15-18.
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jury wheel was made up of women during the significant time
period. 5 The court noted that petitioner failed to account sta-
tistically for women who claimed sex-neutral exemptions, such
as age over 65 or employment in government service. However,
the court felt that, even if defendant had accounted for the sex-
neutral exemptions, the numbers of women summoned and
appearing "were well above acceptable constitutional stan-
dards" as enunciated in Taylor.'6
After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court reversed. Justice White, writing for the Court, stated:
"[I]n certain crucial respects the Missouri Supreme Court
misconceived the nature of the fair-cross-section inquiry set
forth in Taylor."7 The Court then enunciated a three-pronged
test for demonstrating a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-
section requirement:
[D]efendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be
excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2)
that the representation of this group in venires from which
juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to
the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that
the underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of
the group in the jury selection process.
The Court first found that Taylor established women as a
distinctive group, such that their elimination from jury service
violated the fair-cross-section requirement, thereby satisfying
the first element of the prima facie case.
The Court further held that defendant's statistical evi-
dence clearly established a prima facie case of underrepre-
sentation of women on the venires, contrary to the Missouri
court's holding. The Missouri court had speculated that the
1970 census data might be inadequate for comparison to venire
composition because the census was six years old at time of
trial and might not precisely reflect the percentage of women
registered to vote. The Supreme Court was unimpressed by the
state court's argument for statistical exactitude. In the Court's
view, it was irrelevant whether statistics reflected a pool of
women eligible for jury service, as did the statistics in Taylor,
or whether the statistics demonstrated the actual number of
15. Id. at 16.
16. Id. at 16-17.
17. 439 U.S. at 363.
18. Id. at 364.
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women in the community as a whole. No evidence was intro-
duced establishing that use of the 1970 census "significantly
distorted the percentage of women" available for jury duty,
and the Court would not accept speculation regarding possible
distortion to rebut defendant's prima facie case. Thus defen-
dant's statistical proof clearly established the second element
of the prima facie case, underrepresentation in comparison to
the community."9
Finally, the Court found that defendant's proof estab-
lished that the underrepresentation of women was due to the
jury selection process. The defendant demonstrated large dis-
crepancies between the percentage of women in the community
and the venires' composition each week for nearly a year. The
Court stated that continuous underrepresentation of the kind
demonstrated "was systematic-that is, inherent in the partic-
ular jury-selection process utilized."' "
The defendant's statistics established, to the satisfaction
of the Court, those points in the selection process where exclu-
sion occurred. Women could claim exemptions from jury serv-
ice upon receipt of the questionnaire, upon receipt of the sum-
mons, or by simple failure to appear for service on the ap-
pointed day. No indication was given that the canvass of pro-
spective jurors, chosen at random from the voter registration
list, resulted in discrepancies. Only 26.7 percent of those sum-
moned, however, were women, which indicated to the Court
that many women returned the questionnaire claiming exemp-
tion or ineligibility. Since only 14.5 percent of the venires were
women, it seemed obvious to the Court that the automatic
exemption also promoted underrepresentation at the final
stages of the jury selection process. In the Court's analysis, the
consistent, large discrepancies were clearly "due to the system
by which the juries were selected . . . .Women were therefore
systematically underrepresented within the meaning of
Taylor. "
Once a prima facie fair-cross-section violation is estab-
lished, the burden shifts to the state to show that "attainment
of a fair-cross-section [is] . . .incompatible with a significant
state interest." 2 The suggestions of the Missouri Supreme
19. Id. at 364-66.
20. Id. at 366.
21. Id. at 367.
22. Id. at 368.
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Court that valid, sex-neutral exemptions may have caused the
underrepresentation were insufficient to meet that burden.
Furthermore, the state could offer no substantial justification
for the exemptions, since it was unreasonable to assume that
no women could be spared from their jobs for jury service.
While the state could legitimately tailor statutes exempting
members of families who cared for children, the Court stressed
that states must be careful "in exempting broad categories of
persons from jury service. '2 3
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority
opinion created a hybrid doctrine amalgamating fourteenth
amendment equal protection analysis and sixth amendment
analysis. Rehnquist noted that the language of the opinion had
strong equal protection overtones, as the majority required a
"significant state interest" to be advanced by exemption cri-
teria, and not merely "rational grounds" for a disproportion.24
He found the statistical analysis of the decision particularly
objectionable. Whereas prior cases concerned "outright exclu-
sion" of groups, according to the dissent, Duren involved mere
underrepresentation. Thus, the Justice stated,
Eventually the Court either will insist that women be
treated identically to men for purposes of jury selection
. or in some later sequel to this line of cases will dis-
cover some peculiar magic in the number 15 that will ena-
ble it to distinguish between such a percentage and a
higher percentage less than 50. . . .If it ultimately con-
cludes that a percentage of women on jury panels greater
than 15 but substantially less than 50 is permissible even
though the State's jury selection system permits women
but not men to "opt out" of jury service, it is simply play-
ing a constitutional numbers game. 25
Justice Rehnquist predicted that the majority opinion will
wreak havoc with jury selection procedures. In an attempt to
avoid conviction reversals on the basis of jury composition,
states could be forced to abandon gender and occupation-based
classifications relying instead on case-by-case determinations
of qualifications for service. According to the Justice's ration-
ale, the administrative cost of such determinations would be
wholly out of proportion to the end achieved.2 1 In brief, Justice
23. Id. at 370.
24. Id. at 371.
25. Id. at 374-75.
26. Id. at 377.
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Rehnquist contended that a criminal defendant is entitled to
an impartial tribunal, not a jury perfectly balanced in its com-
position.
The majority opinion in Duren v. Missouri affirmed the
Court's earlier stance in Taylor v. Louisiana, that exclusionary
procedures that significantly reduce or eliminate representa-
tion of distinctive groups on venires must serve significant state
interests. Whether the Court will tamper with jury composition
as much as Justice Rehnquist fears remains to be seen. The
decision has a definite undercurrent of equal protection analy-
sis, and, as the dissent suggested, the limit of the analysis is
unclear where the primary purpose of the sixth amendment is
perceived as trial before an impartial tribunal. Which jury
composition guarantees an impartial tribunal or fair trial? The
boundaries of the Court's statistical analysis are unclear.
Focusing on the character of the exemption, rather than
statistical disparities, could avoid the "constitutional numbers
game" abhorred by Justice Rehnquist. The Court simply will
not tolerate assumptions regarding the capacity of a particular
group to serve on juries. If exemptions from jury service specifi-
cally involve incapacity to serve, such as illness, family respon-
sibilities, or hardship, without presuming that a "distinctive
group" fits within one of those categories, statistical disparities
could be less important to the Court than the dissent believes.
Statistical disparities only assume importance where diversity
is viewed as an element of impartiality, and that view Justice
Rehnquist is not prepared to adopt.
Evet Abt
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CRIMINAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION REQUIRES
THAT DEFENDANTS INDICATED BY A GRAND JURY
BE GRANTED A POST-INDICTMENT PRELIMINARY
HEARING-Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586
P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978).
In a multiple count indictment, the San Francisco Grand
Jury charged defendants with various crimes including con-
spiracy and grand theft. Defendants were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty on all counts. Their motion for dismissal or
post-indictment preliminary hearing was denied. The case
reached the California Supreme Court on writ of mandate
where the defendants argued that the due process and equal
protection clauses of both the federal and state constitutions
required granting of an adversarial preliminary hearing. The
court concluded that "denial of a post-indictment preliminary
hearing deprived defendants herein of equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by article I, section 7, of the California Consti-
tution."'
Justice Mosk, writing for the majority, declared that de-
fendants charged by indictments are denied substantial proce-
dural rights that are available to those charged by information.
These include rights to a preliminary hearing before a neutral
magistrate, representation by counsel, confrontation and cross-
examination of hostile witnesses, and the opportunity to per-
sonally appear and affirmatively present exculpatory evidence.
The court rejected the Attorney General's argument that
any disparity in procedural' rights was effectively eliminated by
judicial review of the grand jury's probable cause determina-
tion. The court concluded that judicial review of an ex parte
indictment failed to provide the defendant those "pragmatic
functions" of an adversarial preliminary hearing that go be-
yond a mere judicial determination of probable cause. The
court specifically mentioned the following: 1) the opportunity
to "fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-
examination of the State's witnesses at trial;" 2) the opportun-
ity to "preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a witness
© 1979 by Tom May.
1. Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 593, 586 P.2d 916, 922, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 435, 441 (1978). In a footnote, the court declared that People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal.
3d 710, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972), "[t]o the extent it is contrary to the
views herein expressed . . . is overruled." 22 Cal. 3d at 593 n.7, 586 P.2d at 922 n.7,
150 Cal. Rptr. at 441 n.7.
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who does not appear at the trial;" 3) the "important discovery
function" of an "adversarial preliminary hearing" that would
enhance the ability of defense counsel to "evaluate the desira-
bility of entering a plea or to prepare for trial;" and, 4) the early
opportunity of defense counsel to argue for psychiatric exami-
nation or bail.' Nor was the court convinced that such benefits
would be secured by the availability of a grand jury transcript,
since it would "invariably reflect only what the prosecuting
attorney permits it to reflect."'
This perceived lack of grand jury independence and objec-
tivity was also fatal to any assumption that a probable cause
determination was substantially the same whether found by a
grand jury with subsequent judicial review or by a magistrate
at a preliminary hearing.
Relying on the modern history of the grand jury, the court
observed that because of its inconsistent functions of accuser
and impartial fact finder, the role of the grand jury as a pro-
tector of the individual against prosecutorial abuse had suc-
cumbed to prosecutorial control. The court concluded that
this lack of objectivity "affects the grand jurors when they
vote to indict [and] infects the record for purposes of review."
Moreover, the "lack of defense participation in the develop-
ment of a reviewable record creates a heavy bias in favor of
finding that the grand jury indictment was based on probable
cause."
Having found the indicted defendant to be "seriously dis-
advantaged," the court held that the prosecuting attorney's
discretion in choosing the method by which a defendant is to
be charged violated equal protection by creating a classifica-
tion that impaired the fundamental rights of indicted defen-
dants. By impinging on such fundamental rights as the rights
to counsel, to confrontation of witnesses, to personally appear,
to have a hearing before a judicial officer, and to be free from
unwarranted prosecution, the grand-jury-indictment/charge-
by-information distinction invoked the strict scrutiny of the
courts. Although the Attorney General was able to demon-
2. 22 Cal. 3d at 588, 586 P.2d at 918-19, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 437-38 (citing Coleman
v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) as cataloging some of the "pragmatic functions"
of the preliminary hearing).
3. 22 Cal. 3d. at 589, 586 P.2d at 919, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 438. Grand jury tran-
scripts are made available by CAL. PENAL CODE § 938.1 (West Supp. 1979).
4. 22 Cal. 3d at 591, 586 P.2d at 920-21, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 439-40.
5. The court cited Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr.
345 (1976), as the basis for its equal protection analysis. Serrano is well known for its
assertion that:
1120 [Vol. 19
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strate a state interest in some tactical advantages gained by
use of the indictment procedure, the court found that the inter-
ests were not compelling so as to justify denial of the pragmatic
functions of a preliminary hearing. Nor was the Attorney Gen-
eral able to demonstrate that denial of a preliminary hearing
was necessary to preserve the state's tactical advantages.'
In fashioning a remedy, the Hawkins court was careful not
to intrude directly on the grand jury's indicting function, spe-
cifically sanctioned by the California Constitution.7 Instead,
the court made the existing preliminary hearing procedure
[California] equal protection provisions, while "substantially the equiv-
alent of" the guarantees contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, are possessed of an independent vitality
.... Accordingly, decisions of the United States Supreme Court defin-
ing fundamental rights are persuasive authority . . . but are to be fol-
lowed by California courts only when they provide no less individual
protection than is guaranteed by California law.
Id. at 764, 557 P.2d at 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366 (citing Dept. of Mental Hygiene v.
Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 588, 400 P.2d 321, 322, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 330 (1965)). Reliance
on Serrano casts considerable doubt on the court's assertion in Hawkins that the
"fundamental rights" dealt with there "are expressly or impliedly grounded in both
state and federal Constitutions . 22 Cal. 3d at 593, 586 P.2d at 921, 150 Cal.
Rptr. at 440.
6. The Hawkins majority opinion listed the following tactical advantages:
A prosecutor may proceed by indictment for valid reasons: the pro-
spective defendant cannot be found; witnesses may fear testifying in
court; the case may have potential for prejudicial pretrial publicity; pub-
licity may jeopardize a continuing investigation; a preliminary examina-
tion may involve prolonged delay because of the number of defendants
or the complexity of the case.
22 Cal. 3d at 593 n.6, 586 P.2d at 921-22 n.6, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 440-41 at n.6.
In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Mosk provided a more complete list.
The reasons usually given by prosecutors for choosing to initiate prosecu-
tions by indictment include the following: indictment procedures (1) save
time; (2) protect witnesses against embarrassing cross-examination; (3)
protect an innocent accused when no indictment is returned; (4) protect
the cover of an informant; (5) protect witnesses against harm or intimida-
tion; (6) allow the prosecuting attorney to test his case and obtain a
community viewpoint on its strength; (7) permit the evidentiary hearing
to be held over an extended period of time; (8) facilitate investigations,
e.g., by providing subpoena availability without the initiation of formal
proceedings; (9) allow the prosecutor to toll the statute of limitations
when the defendant is absent (Pen. Code, §§ 800, 803); (10) protect the
defendant from prejudicial pretrial publicity; (11) protect society from
the flight of the accused; and (12) permit the prosecuting attorney to
share responsibility for the prosecution with the grand jury when there is
great public interest in a case.
Id. at 604, 586 P.2d at 529, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 448. Significantly, the requirement of a
post-indictment preliminary hearing leaves a number of these tactical advantages still
available to the prosecutor.
7. CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 14, 23; CAL. PENAL CODE § 917 (West Supp. 1979).
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available to indicted defendants who request it prior to, or at
the same time that they enter a plea. Upon such a request, the
court may order the prosecuting attorney to refile the indict-
ment as a complaint thereby activating the preliminary hear-
ing procedures of the California Penal Code.' The court limited
the decision to the present case and to indicted defendants who
had not entered a plea at the time the opinion became final.
Two aspects of the Hawkins decision are significant.' First,
there will be an obvious inhibitory impact on the prosecutorial
use of the grand jury. As a practical matter, however, this im-
pact may be more apparent than real. The decision was limited
to the indicting function of the grand jury. The grand jury's
investigative role was left untouched. In addition, charge by
indictment may still be used where its important tactical ad-
vantages are undisturbed by requiring a post-indictment pre-
liminary hearing. For example, the indictment may be used to
toll the statute of limitations on an absent defendant.
A more important impact of Hawkins is its treatment of
the preliminary hearing as the remedy of choice in securing
procedural rights fundamental to the constitutional function-
ing of the criminal justice system. One author has described
the preliminary hearing as "hover[ing] close to being a matter
of constitutional right."' 0 While the court's use of equal pro-
tection analysis avoided that conclusion, it did mention that
"serious" due process issues were involved. This, coupled with
the premise that the purpose of a preliminary hearing is greater
than a judicial determination of probable cause, lays the basis
for a strong argument that the pragmatic functions of the pre-
liminary hearing have risen to the status of substantive consti-
tutional rights.
Clearly the court's decision should focus attention on the
preliminary hearing as an adversarial judicial process for the
protection of individual rights against the abuses of prosecu-
8. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 859-883 (West Supp. 1979).
9. While not relevant to the result in Hawkins, another feature of the case de-
serves mention. In an unusual concurrence to his own majority opinion, Justice Mosk
urged abandonment of traditional two-tier equal protection analysis for one involving
a third, intermediate level of review. Justice Newman joined in this opinion. Chief
Justice Bird's concurring opinion argued against adoption of an intermediate scrutiny
of equal protection claims. 22 Cal. 3d at 595-610, 586 P.2d at 923-33, 150 Cal. Rptr. at
442-52.
10. Comment, The Preliminary Hearing Versus the Grand Jury Indictment:
"Wasteful Nonsense of Criminal Jurisprudence" Revisited, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 825, 825
(1974).
[Vol. 191122
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torial discretion and power. Read in this light, Hawkins is a
ready resource for an attack on perfunctory preliminary hear-
ings which fail to protect the defendant's rights. The message
of Hawkins is that the preliminary hearing must be adversarial
and must be taken seriously if it is to carry the constitutional
burden that the court has placed upon it.
Tom May

NEGLIGENCE-SCHOOL DISTRICT LIABLE FOR
TRUANT'S INJURIES IF DISTRICT'S NEGLIGENT
SUPERVISION IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF SUCH
INJURIES-Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District,
22 Cal. 3d 508, 585 P.2d 851, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1978).
Plaintiff Michael Hoyem, a 10-year-old boy, attended
summer session at Foster A. Begg School in the defendant
school district. On July 16, 1974, Michael arrived at school to
attend classes. Before the end of the scheduled school day, he
left the school premises without permission from school author-
ities. Subsequently, Michael was struck by a motorcycle and
seriously injured.'
Michael and his mother initiated the present action
against the school district alleging that the accident and result-
ing injuries were proximately caused by the school district's
negligent supervision. Michael sought recovery for injuries sus-
tained in the accident. Michael's mother sought recovery for
his medical care as well as damages resulting from the physical
and emotional injury she suffered when confronted with his
injured state. In the trial court, defendant's demurrer to all
causes of action was sustained and the action was dismissed.2
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed the
trial court's dismissal of the cause of action seeking recovery for
Michael's injuries and medical expenses. Mary Ann Hoyem's
cause of action, based on loss of Michael's "comfort and so-
ciety," was held properly dismissed by the trial court.
In ruling that Michael Hoyem's allegations stated a cause
of action, the court initially reiterated that a school district
may be held liable for a student's off-campus injuries if plain-
tiff can prove the injuries were a result of the school authorities'
negligent supervision of the student while on school premises.
The court cited Satariano v. Sleight, 3 which held that a school
district could be liable for a student's injury on a public street.
The pleading in the instant case was also compared to Dailey
© 1979 by Sandra Kloster.
1. Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District, 22 Cal. 3d 508, 512,585 P.2d
851, 852-53, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2-3 (1978).
2. Id. at 512, 585 P.2d at 853, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
3. 54 Cal. App. 2d 278, 129 P.2d 35 (1942). See also Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger
Co., 12 Cal. 2d 310, 83 P.2d 948 (1938). In Taylor, the school district had knowledge
of a student practice of running out along the playground to the gym. The district was
held liable for failing to take adequate precautionary measures to prevent accidents.
1125
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v. Los Angeles Unified School District,4 where a student died
as a result of "slap boxing" with another student in the school
gym during the noon recess. The court observed that the com-
plaints in both cases alleged the school district's negligence in
supervising students while on school premises and that the
resulting injury was proximately caused by such negligence.'
The school district argued that their acknowledged duty to
supervise pupils while on school grounds did not encompass
responsibility for assuring that pupils would remain on the
school premises during the school day. The court, however,
utilized Dailey to point out that the duty to supervise included
the duty to "enforce those rules and regulations necessary [for
a pupil's] protection."' The California Administrative Code at
section 303 provides:
A pupil may not leave the school premises at recess, or at
any other time before the regular hour for closing school,
except in case of emergency, or with the approval of the
principal of the school.7
This rule, the court reasoned, must have been promulgated for
the protection of students.
Defendant also maintained that no school district had
been found liable for a student's off-campus injuries in any
California case. In addition to finding defendant's argument
"simply inaccurate," citing Satariano, the court noted the ar-
gument was beside the point in that the case did not concern
the scope of defendant school district's off-campus supervisory
duty. The alleged negligence concerned the district's duty of
supervising while Michael was still on school premises. Further
availing itself of Satariano, the court refuted defendant's claim
that the off-campus situs of the injury was sufficient to vitiate
school district liability. The court in Satariano viewed the
street as an extension of the school premises where students
remained subject to the control of school authorities.'
The defendant also argued for immunity under Education
Code section 44808, which provides that a school district is not
liable for a student's safety when the student is not on school
4. 2 Cal. 3d 741, 470 P.2d 360, 87 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1970).
5. 22 Cal. 3d at 513-14, 585 P.2d at 853-54, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 3-4.
6. 2 Cal. 3d at 747, 470 P.2d at 363, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
7. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 303 (1978).
8. See Calandri v. one Unified School District, 219 Cal. App. 2d 542, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 333 (1963). In Calandri a school district was liable for injury sustained at home
as a result of a dangerous instrument made in shop class.
[Vol. 191126
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property unless the school district has provided transportation
or has sponsored an off-campus school activity.' The court re-
jected defendant's interpretation and pointed out that the code
section explicitly withdraws immunity when the school district
"has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circum-
stances."10
Defendant predicted fortress-like schools and argued that
overwhelming policy considerations prohibit holding a school
district liable when a student is injured while "playing hooky."
Defendant suggested:
Holding a school district liable for such an injury to a
truant would lead. . . to "truant-proof" schools, where, to
avoid liability, school personnel would be required vir-
tually to chain students to their desks to keep them from
leaving." 1
The court called these fears unwarranted since a district is
liable only if it is negligent in supervision and injuries proxi-
mately result from the lack of due care.
Finally, the court rejected defendant's contention that,
because the injury occurred during a voluntary summer ses-
sion, the duty to supervise, required during the school year
when attendance is compulsory, should not be imposed. Once
a student is enrolled in summer session he or she must attend.
Therefore, the trust parents place in a school to supervise their
children is not diminished. 2
The court next considered the issue of proximate cause.
Defendant maintained that, "as a matter of law, negligent on-
9. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44808 (West 1978):
Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, no school district, city
or county board of education, county superintendent of schools, or any
officer or employee of such district or board shall be responsible or in any
way liable for the conduct or safety of any pupil of the public schools at
any time when such pupil is not on school property, unless such district,
board, or person has undertaken to provide transportation for such pupil
to and from the school premises, has undertaken a school-sponsored ac-
tivity off the premises of such school, has otherwise specifically assumed
such responsibility or liability or has failed to exercise reasonable care
under the circumstances.
In the event of such a specific undertaking, the district, board, or
person shall be liable or responsible for the conduct or safety of any pupil
only while such pupil is or should be under the immediate and direct
supervision of an employee of such district or board.
10. 22 Cal. 3d at 517, 585 P.2d at 856, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
11. Id. at 519, 585 P.2d at 857, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
12. Id.
1979] 1127
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campus supervision cannot be the proximate cause of an off-
campus injury."'" In dismissing defendant's argument, the
court stated that the question of proximate cause is generally
one of fact for the jury and that the trial court could not, as a
matter of law, determine whether defendant's negligent super-
vision was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
Defendant contended that a school district should not be
expected to foresee "that students will take advantage of a
lapse in supervision to leave the school premises, and therefore
that any off-campus injury is unforeseeable as a matter of
law."" In reply, the court reasoned that a jury might conclude
that defendant could have readily foreseen the temptation of
leaving school premises during a summer session; as such,
plaintiff's activity was not unforeseeable as a matter of law.
Defendant further argued that the motorcyclist who hit the
plaintiff represented a superseding cause, cutting off any liabil-
ity on the part of the school district. The court rejected this
argument, quoting from Dailey: "Neither the mere involve-
ment of a third party nor that party's wrongful conduct is
sufficient in itself to absolve the defendants of liability, once a
negligent failure to provide adequate supervision is shown."' 5
If the intervening cause was foreseeable by the defendant, or if
the injury was of a foreseeable type, the defendant is not re-
lieved of liability. Therefore, the subsequent negligence of the
motorcyclist did not preclude liability on the part of the defen-
dant school district.
Finally, the court ruled that Mary Ann Hoyem's cause of
action for the loss of Michael's "comfort and society" and for
her own injuries was properly dismissed."' The court refused to
extend the cause of action recognized in Dillon v. Legg, '7 which
held that recovery depends on the mother having witnessed the
death of or injury to her child.
In dissent, Justice Clark was highly critical of the
"insurmountable duties and financial burdens" imposed on a
public school district by the decision. He suggested that school
districts are forced into a double bind. They must insure
truants against third party tortfeasors for injuries sustained off
13. Id. at 520, 585 P.2d at 858, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 521, 585 P.2d at 858, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 8 (quoting Dailey v. Los Angeles
Unified School District, 2 Cal. 3d at 750, 470 P.2d at 365, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 381).
16. Id. at 522, 585 P.2d at 859, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
17. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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school premises, and/or lower campus size, erect barriers, and
increase campus security to police all points of exit in order to
reduce truancy. Justice Clark stated:
In view of the tremendous financial impact resulting from
adoption of Proposition 13 in the Primary Election of 1978,
the majority decision will surely hasten the insolvency of
some school districts as predicted by the State Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction.'"
Also dissenting, Justice Richardson concluded that, for
policy reasons, liability should not be imposed on a school dis-
trict for injuries suffered by a student who voluntarily leaves
the campus during school hours. "A line should be drawn limit-
ing a school's liability to injuries to a pupil which occur on
school property, when the pupil is transported to, or participat-
ing in, a school sponsored or school related activity . . .,.
The decision appears to be a retreat from two recent tort
liability cases: Peter W v. San Francisco,0 and Borer v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc.," in which the court declined to further ex-
tend public liability. In Borer, the court refused to recognize
a new cause of action for loss of consortium in a parent-child
relationship and suggested restraints when one seeks to ex-
tend public liability. In Peter W, the plaintiff sought to fash-
ion a new area of school district liability for educational mal-
practice. The court, again taking into consideration the social
and financial problems which beset school districts, refused
to extend liability. Hoyem differs from Borer and Peter W in
that the plaintiff sought to base liability on a physical injury,
a harm more readily ascertainable and comprehensible to the
court. The judicial recognition of a new area of tort liability
seems to be facilitated by an injury that has an accepted and
measurable standard.
The Hoyem court maintained that a district will not be
liable for a truant's injuries unless they proximately result from
the district's failure to exercise reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances. Nevertheless, the decision achieves practically the
same outcome by imposing a duty which will be almost impos-
sible to satisfy. The court ignores the fact that even an habitual
truant cannot be suspended from school:" "The majority thus
18. 22 Cal. 3d at 524-25, 585 P.2d at 861, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
19. Id. at 527-28, 585 P.2d at 863, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
20. 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
21. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
22. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 1978).
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proposes to make a school district the insurer of the safety of
such persons although the district lacks the power to control
their movements. ' 23
The decision in Hoyem will likely have a substantial im-
pact on the current financial crisis confronting California
school districts. Despite the California Supreme Court's con-
tention that its ruling "in no way expands the supervisory obli-
gations of school districts and does not place a new duty upon
school authorities to control the conduct of students when they
are off school premises, '2 4 it appears that the court has fash-
ioned yet a new area of school district liability.
Sandra Kloster
23. 22 Cal. 3d at 525 n.2, 585 P.2d at 856 n.2, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 11 n.2. (Clark,
J., concurring and dissenting).
24. Id. at 523, 585 P.2d at 860, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - WHERE AN OFFENDER IS
OUT OF STATE AFTER COMMISSION OF A CRIME, THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS TOLLED DURING HIS
ABSENCE - Scherling v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 493,
585 P.2d 219, 149 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1978).
In March, 1976, an information was filed against the de-
fendant Scherling that charged four counts of burglary' com-
mitted in Santa Clara County in 1966, 1967, and 1968. In July,
1969, defendant had moved to Idaho after losing his job in
Santa Clara County. He left a forwarding address with the post
office, was listed in the telephone directory, and used his true
name at all times.
The Santa Clara police did not even suspect the defendant
of having committed the burglaries until at least 1975. Police
in Delano, California, had arrested defendant Scherling and
another, Ducote, for a burglary committed in Delano on May
30, 1967. The Delano authorities learned of defendant's illegal
activities in Santa Clara. However, the Santa Clara police were
not apprised of this, since charges were later dropped by De-
lano police.'
In 1975, a man named Boyes contacted the California De-
partment of Justice about Ducote's involvement in other politi-
cal burglaries. Ducote, contacted by the Department in 1975,
confessed to the Santa Clara burglaries and implicated Scher-
ling in the same burglaries. The Department notified the Santa
Clara authorities of this information late in 1975. After a pre-
liminary hearing regarding Ducote's involvement in these
crimes, Santa Clara County investigators flew to Idaho where
they met with defendant in early 1976. During that year, defen-
dant came to San Jose, California, where he was arrested by
Santa Clara police.
After the information was filed against Scherling in 1976,
© 1979 by Kirk A. Musacchio.
1. Defendant was charged with entry with intent to commit a felony under CAL.
PENAL CODE § 459 (West 1970).
2. In June, 1967, Ducote met with Delano police to pursuade them not to con-
tinue the investigation. Ducote showed them documents taken from the Santa Clara
County burglaries and alleged they were given to an organization with close ties to the
F.B.I. The purpose was to show that the burglaries were committed to obtain subver-
sive matter for governmental use, so that the investigation would be discontinued. The
investigation was discontinued on the grounds that the victims failed to cooperate with
the investigation.
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he brought this action for a writ of prohibition to restrain the
trial court from proceeding to trial on the ground that the court
lacked jurisdiction.3 He claimed that the three-year statute of
limitations, applicable to burglary under Penal Code section
800, had run before the filing of the information.' The prosecu-
tion argued that the statute of limitations defense was unavail-
able because the defendant had left the state in July, 1969, and
the running of the statute was halted under Penal Code section
802.1 The trial court agreed with that argument.
On appeal, the issues presented were: 1) whether section
802 should apply when defendant was not accused of flight
from prosecution, no warrant was issued for his arrest before or
after his departure, and state officials knew or should have
known of his departure; and 2) whether section 802 violated
defendant's constitutional right of travel, equal protection, due
process, and the right to a speedy trial, under the United States
and California Constitutions.' The California Supreme Court
held that the section 800 statute of limitations was properly
tolled under section 802, and that the trial court could proceed
to trial on the information.
The court rejected defendant's argument that he had been
available despite being out of the state and that section 802 was
to apply only to assure that the accused was available for prose-
cution. Instead, the court reasoned that the legislature could
3. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1102 (West Supp. 1979).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 800 (West Supp. 1979) states in pertinent part: "An indict-
ment for any felony [exceptions listed] . . . shall be found, an information filed, or
case certified to the superior court within three years after its commission." The
offenses charged occurred in 1966, 1967, and 1968, and the information was not filed
until February, 1976, well after passage of the statute of limitations.
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 802 (West 1970) is the crux of this case:
If, when or after the offense is committed, the defendant is out of the
State, an indictment may be found, a complaint or an information filed
or a case certified to the superior court, in any case originally triable in
the superior court, or a complaint may be filed, in any case originally
triable in any other court, within the term limited by law; and no time
during which the defendant is not within this State, is a part of any
limitation of the time for commencing a criminal action.
If § 802 is applied to the defendant's actions, the information would be filed
properly, within the three year statute of limitations for burglary found in § 800. See
note 4 supra. Mechanically, the court noted that defendant left the state approxi-
mately two years and eight months after committing the first crime and one year, five
months after the last offense. The defendant returned to the state, in February, 1976.
Since the information was filed in March, 1976, this was within the § 800 three-year
limit.
6. Scherling v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 493, 500, 585 P.2d 219, 223, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 597, 601 (1978).
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have rationally designed section 802 to increase the likelihood
of detection and identification of criminals. Because the result
(even if not the intent) of an accused's departure from the
state frustrates these goals, the court held that the statute
of limitations should be tolled, even though defendant is
"available."
The court next addressed the allegation that section 802
violated defendant's freedom to travel and right to equal pro-
tection of the laws7 by imposing residence requirements as a
condition to receiving the "benefits" of state law. The court
noted that:
[T]here is clearly a distinction between one who, like de-
fendant, leaves the state after committing a crime . . .
and one who has committed no crime but is deprived of'
government benefit merely because he exercises his right
to travel. 8
In the first situation, there are state interests in making sure
the defendant is locally available and in avoiding burdensome
extradition proceedings.
The court rejected defendant's assertion that his equal
protection and right-to-travel arguments should be tested by
the strict scrutiny standard. Instead, the court applied the less
strict rational relationship test.' The court thus concluded that
7. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
8. 22 Cal. 3d at 501, 585 P.2d at 223, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 602. The court distin-
guished In re King, 3 Cal. 3d 226, 474 P.2d 983, 90 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1970). That case
involved CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1970), which imposed a higher penalty (felony)
on non-supporting fathers who remain out-of-state over thirty days, as opposed to
those who remain in the state (misdemeanor). The court held that this scheme violated
both equal protection and the right to travel because it imposed additional criminal
liability upon a person solely because he chose to remain out-of-state.
The court held this case was distinguishable, because in Scherling, the defendant
was not subjected to a greater criminal penalty because he left the state. Also, there
was a state interest in detecting crime and identifying the criminal not present in King
(the identity of the nonsupporting father was not in doubt).
9. "Strict scrutiny" and "rational relationship" are equal protection tests estab-
lished by the United States Supreme Court. Strict scrutiny involves examination of a
suspect classification which must be supported by a compelling state objective. For
example, a state statute that discriminates against race will not stand unless necessary
to accomplish some compelling state objective, and the discriminatory classification
itself must be necessary to achieve that objective. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967). The state statute rarely survives this analysis.
The rational relationship test involves a search for any conceivable state purpose
that might rationally justify a classification. A state usually will survive this test. See,
e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
Thus, the Scherling court noted that: "[Tihe Legislature could have determined
that the detection of the crime and identification of the criminal are more likely if the
criminal remains in the state than if he departs." 22 01l. 3d at 503, 585 P.2d at 225,
149 Cal. Rptr. at 603 (emphasis added).
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the legislature, in passing section 802, could have determined
that detection of crime and criminal identification are more
likely if an accused remains in the state and that such a restric-
tion on defendant's activity would have a rational relationship
to a valid government interest in preventing crime.'" Having
disposed of the right-to-travel defense, the court similarly held
that the tolling of the statute of limitations did not deprive
defendant of a fundamental liberty interest."
The court next examined the defendant's right to a speedy
trial.'" Although California extends this right to the pre-
indictment stage, the court found that the defendant claimed
the right even prior to the filing of the complaint-when the
state has decided to charge a defendant or has a basis for doing
so, but delays the arrest. The court concluded that a delay
between the time the crime is committed and a complaint is
filed or a formal arrest made, is not to be measured by the right
to speedy trial, but rather, by the right to due process of law."
Under either theory, the test to be applied is a balancing
of the prejudice caused by the delay against the justification
10. The court acknowledged Zimmerman v. Superior Court, 248 Cal. App. 2d 56,
56 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1967), as a possible limitation to the tolling of the statute of limita-
tions in Scherling. In Zimmerman, the defendant was incarcerated in another jurisdic-
tion. The court held that § 802 did not apply, since the defendant made a request to
the Los Angeles district attorney that he be brought to trial at the earliest possible time
on the California charges, and the district attorney failed to comply. Also, there was
no excuse for the failure of the prosecution to bring extradiction proceedings. 248 Cal.
App. 2d at 63, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
11. The court distinguished defendant's reliance on People v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d
236, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976), and Cotton v. Municipal Court, 59 Cal.
App. 3d 601, 130 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1976). Olivas involved CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
1731.5 (West 1972), which penalized misdemeanants between the ages of 16 and 21,
by providing for potentially longer terms of incarceration than other misdemeanants.
Using strict scrutiny as the test, the court could find no compelling state interest that
would justify, inter alia, the denial of a fundamental interest in liberty. 17 Cal. 3d at
251-52, 551 P.2d at 385, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
In Cotton, the statute imposed criminal sanctions on nonsupporting fathers under
CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1978), but not nonsupporting mothers. The court
used the strict scrutiny standard since the statute denied the defendant equal pro-
tection on grounds of both sex discrimination and invasion of a personal liberty inter-
est. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 605, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
By contrast, Scherling involved neither greater penalties, nor discrimination
based on sex, and therefore strict scrutiny would not apply.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
13. 22 Cal. 3d at 505, 585 P.2d at 226, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 604. This principle was
derived from People v. Archerd, 3 Cal. 3d 615, 477 P.2d 421, 91 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1970),
which involved an eleven-year delay between a murder and the filing of an indictment
against the defendant. The delay was caused by the absence of a test to confirm the
police's suspicion that defendant murdered his victims by insulin injections.
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for the delay.' A showing of prejudice, coupled with unjustified
delay in prosecution, is a denial of due process." The defendant
claimed prejudice from the delay since his memory of the
crimes had faded and several witnesses who could have verified
his defense had died or were otherwise unavailable. Relying on
the findings of the trial court, the supreme court found that
defendant's testimony showed no loss of memory, and that the
unavailable witnesses would have testified only regarding de-
fendant's intent and other witnesses were available to testify
on that issue. Thus, the supreme court found neither deliberate
delay in prosecution nor prejudice to the defense, that would
justify a finding of denial of due process.
The significance of Scherling lies in its factual setting.
Tolling the statute of limitations for criminals in flight is justi-
fiable to further the state's purposes in identifying criminals
and detecting crime. However, applying section 802 to an ac-
cused who has not attempted to conceal his identity nor his
location and has left the state for valid reasons is a quantum
leap forward. Equal protection should be a more viable argu-
ment in the latter situation, since the difference between the
in-state and out-of-state defendant narrows considerably. In-
deed, inequality seems apparent where section 802 is applied
to an accused who publicly holds himself out, but is not applied
when an out-of-state defendant requests that he be brought to
trial on charges in California. 6
Kirk A. Musacchio
14. 22 Cal. 3d at 505 n.9, 585 P.2d at 227 n.9, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 604 n.9. The court
cites Jones v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 734, 741 n.1, 478 P.2d 10, 15 n.1, 91 Cal. Rptr.
578, 583 n.1 (1970), and People v. Bradford, 17 Cal. 3d 8, 18-19, 549 P.2d 1225, 1231-
32, 130 Cal. Rptr. 129, 135-36 (1976), for the application of a balancing test in the pre-
indictment situation.
15. 22 Cal. 3d at 506-07, 585 P.2d at 227, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 605.




THE WEARING OF MASKS IN PUBLIC IS UNCONSTI-
TUTIONAL AS OVERBROAD AND VAGUE AND AS
DENYING EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS-Ghafari
v. Municipal Court, 87 Cal. App. 3d 255, 150 Cal. Rptr. 813
(1978), hearing denied, Feb. 14, 1979.
On separate occasions, two Iranian students were engaged
in peaceful demonstrations with other pickets on the sidewalk
in front of the Iranian consulate in San Francisco. In the first
incident, Farzad Ghafari was arrested for violating California's
"mask statute" on the ground that he was picketing in disguise
by placing a leaflet between his glasses and face in order to
conceal his identity.' Appellant Majd was arrested in a subse-
quent demonstration in front of the consulate for the same
reason and under similar circumstances.
The students demurred to the Penal Code section 650a
charge, contending that 1) if their identity as members and
demonstrators of the Iranian Students Association had become
known, serious reprisals might have been taken against them
and against their relatives in Iran by agents of the Iranian
government, and 2) if they had known that they could not
protect their anonymity while picketing they would not have
demonstrated or participated in future demonstrations.2 The
municipal court overruled the demurrers, and the students pe-
titioned the superior court for a writ of prohibition. After con-
ducting hearings based on alternative writs in each case, the
superior court denied the petitions. The cases were consoli-
dated for this appeal.
In the California Court of Appeals, appellants maintained
that section 650a was unconstitutional on its face in three re-
spects. First, the students contended that section 650a was
overbroad because it flatly prohibited anonymity for activities
© 1979 by Gordon Yamate.
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 650a (West 1970) provides:
It is a misdemeanor for any person, either alone or in company with
others, to appear on any street or highway, or in other public places or
any place open to view by the general public, with his face partially or
completely concealed by means of a mask or other regalia or parapherna-
lia, with intent thereby to conceal his identity. This section does not
prohibit the wearing of such means of concealment in good faith for the
purposes of amusement, entertainment or in compliance with any public
health order.
2. Ghafari v. Municipal Ct., 87 Cal. App. 3d 255, 259, 150 Cal. Rptr. 813, 814
(1978).
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protected by the first amendment. As such, the restriction was
not required by a compelling state interest nor implemented in
the least restrictive manner possible.3 Second, appellants
argued that the "mask statute" was void due to vagueness in
two respects: 1) it applied to a face "partially or completely
concealed by means of a mask or other regalia or parapherna-
lia" and 2) it contained an exception for "amusement" or
"entertainment" purposes.' Finally, appellants argued that the
distinction in section 650a between anonymous "entertainment
or amusement" and "anonymous public issue communication"
was a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment because it favored the former activity over the
latter.5
The court of appeals agreed with appellants and held that
the statute was unconstitutional on its face in all three respects
in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments. In ad-
dressing the contention that the statute was overbroad, the
court relied on the landmark decision of the United States
Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,'
which established that under certain circumstances anonymity
may be essential to the exercise of constitutional rights. The
court rejected respondent's arguments, holding that since any
restraint upon the legitimate exercise of first amendment rights
would have come as a result of private action by the Iranian
government, there was no direct state action. The court noted
that the proper focus is on "the interplay of governmental and
private action, for it is only after the initial exertion of state
power represented by . . . [enforcing section 650a] that pri-
vate action takes hold."' Moreover, in citing several Penal
Code provisions, the court concluded that the encompassing
nature of section 650a serves no legitimate law enforcement
function because the state's interest is fully protected by more
narrowly drawn prohibitions.'
3. Id. at 260, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
4. Id. at 264, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
5. Id. at 265, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
6. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
7. 87 Cal. App. 3d at 261, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16 (citing Young v. American
Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 60 (1976)) (bracketed material added by Ghafari court).
8. The court noted that had appellants been masked for criminal purposes, they
would have been in violation of Penal Code § 185. In addition, the court pointed out
that a number of other penal statutes may have come into play including Penal Code
§§ 404 (riot), 406-07 (rout, unlawful assembly), 415 (disturbing the peace), 416 (refus-
ing to disperse), 647(e) (refusal to identify oneself to a police officer), 647(c) (obstruc-
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Respondents contended that the students lacked standing
to raise the vagueness issue because their conduct was precisely
proscribed by statute. The court responded by noting, first,
that such an argument simply begs the question and second,
that regardless of whether appellants' conduct was precisely
proscribed by section 650a, the situation fell within the excep-
tion to traditional rules of standing to raise constitutional is-
sues because "the very existence of . . . [§ 650a] may cause
persons not before the court to refrain from engaging in consti-
tutionally protected speech or expression." ' That exception
recognizes the overriding importance of maintaining a free and
open market for the interchange of ideas."0 On the merits of the
vagueness issue, respondents argued that the statute gave clear
notice that appearing in public "with one's face covered by a
mask or other means of disguise for the purpose of concealing
one's identity" is unlawful. In addressing this argument, the
court explained the importance of providing clearly marked
parameters of lawful conduct, giving a person "a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited," and preventing arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement of such laws." While the
court conceded that a narrower interpretation of the
"concealed by mask" phrase was possible, it determined that
the vagueness of the exception for "amusement" or
"entertainment" purposes could not be cured. Pointing to the
well-established rule that "communication for amusement and
entertainment purposes is protected by the first amendment as
fully as is communication for the exposition and exchange of
ideas," the court stated that such a rule requires the courts to
embrace a wide range of "all forms of communication in order
to protect that which is of potential political relevance.''2
Thus, the exception was held to be "inherently vague" because
it failed to give notice of what is prohibited, failed to set stan-
dards for enforcement, and produced a chilling effect on the
exercise of constitutional rights.' 3
The strict scrutiny test was applied to appellants' final
tion of thoroughfares and public places), and 726-727 (arrest after refusal to disperse).
Id. at 262, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
9. Id. at 263, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 817 (citing Young, 427 U.S. at 60) (bracketed
material added by Ghafari court).
10. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 60 (1976).
11. 87 Cal. App. 3d at 263, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
12. Id. at 264, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 817-18.
13. Id., 150 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
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challenge on equal protection grounds because section 650a was
seen as clearly intertwined with fundamental first amendment
rights. The state failed to meet the burden of showing that the
distinctions drawn by the statute were necessary to further a
compelling state interest." The court also indicated that the
distinction in the statute required differential treatment based
upon the content of the masked person's message; a distinction
which strikes at the heart of forbidden censorship."
While Ghafari v. Municipal Court does not stand for an
absolute right to anonymity for persons engaged in first amend-
ment activities, it underscores the importance of a narrowly
drawn statute when the conduct sought to be prohibited by the
state is closely interwoven with the exercise of first amendment
rights. The opinion in Ghafari expressed an interest in dispel-
ling the "unfounded fear that the mere appearance of anony-
mous persons in public will inevitably lead to violence and
other illegal activities" by pointing to other more narrowly
drawn statutes that exist to protect legitimate state interests.";
However, by its narrow focus on the constitutional construction
of Penal Code section 650a, the court left open the issue of
whether the masks themselves gain first amendment protec-
tion as symbolic expressions of words and ideas.'7
Ironically, legislation which would have repealed section
650a was passed by the California Legislature in 1978, but was
vetoed by the Governor. 8 The veto may have been motivated
in part by a fear that the legislation would weaken the state's
ability to prevent or prosecute rape crimes where masks were
used. Although the court in Ghafari correctly recognized that
more narrowly drawn statutes would fully protect the state's
interest in situations like the Iranian student demonstrations,
the question remains whether section 650a would have been
upheld where first amendment rights were not at issue.
Gordon Yamate
14. Id. at 265, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 266, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
17. Id. at 266 n.5, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 819 n.5.
18. See S.B. 1747 (Sieroty), Cal. Legis. 1977-1978 Reg. Sess.
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